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Attitudes Towards Race, Hierarchy and 
Transformation in the 19th Century* 
Sandra J. Peart 
David M. Levy
Abstract : 
Using the debates between Classical political economists and their critics as our lens, 
this paper examines the question of whether we're the same or different. Starting with 
Adam Smith, Classical economics presumed that humans are the same in their capacity for 
language and trade ; observed differences were then explained by incentives, luck and 
history, and it is the "vanity of the philosopher" incorrectly to conclude otherwise. Such 
"analytical egalitarianism" was overthrown sometime after 1850, when notions of race and 
hierarchy came to infect social analysis as a result of attacks on homogeneity by the 
Victorian Sages (including Thomas Carlyle and John Ruskin), in anthropology and 
biology (James Hunt and Charles Darwin), and among political economists themselves 
(W.R. Greg). Two questions were at issue. Do everyone's preferences count equally, and is 
everyone equally capable of making economic decisions? In Smith's account, philosophers 
and subjects alike are capable of making decisions. The oppositional view held that some 
are different from others. Since "difference" implied "superiority" in the period we study, 
we call this doctrine "analytical hierarchicalism." 
JEL classification numbers : B 12, Z 1.
Ⅰ Introduction
Using the debates between Classical 
political economists and their critics as our 
lens, this paper examines the seemingly sim-
ple question of whether we're the same or 
different. At the beginning and throughout 
much of the nineteenth century, social scien-
tists endorsed a hard form of what we have 
termed "analytical egalitarianism." Starting 
with Adam Smith, Classical economics 
presumed that humans are the same in their
capacity for language and trade ; observed 
differences were then explained by incen-
tives, luck and history, and it is the "vanity of 
the philosopher" incorrectly to conclude that 
ordinary people are somehow different from 
the expert (Smith 1776, i. ii Section 4). We 
show that such analytical egalitarianism was 
overthrown in the Post-Classical period some-
time after 1850, when notions of race and 
hierarchy came to infect economic and social 
analysis as a result of attacks on homogene-
ity by the Victorian Sages (including Thomas
* This paper is an invited summary of our research over the last 5 years . Much of the material here appears in 
more detailed form in our book, The "Vanity of the Philosopher": From Equality to Hierarchy in Post-Classical 
Economics (University of Michigan Press, 2005). We thank this journal's editors and referees for helpful 
comments. The patience and encouragement of Masazumi Wakatabe are particularly appreciated.
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Carlyle and John Ruskin), in anthropology 
and biology (James Hunt and Charles Dar-
win) and among political economists them-
selves (W.R. Greg) .1) We sketch some disas-
trous consequences of the transition to hierar-
chical thinking, and we make the case that 
political economy in the Classical tradition 
rightly presupposed human homogeneity and 
rightly rejected hierarchical presuppositions 
of any sort. 
At issue between analytical egalitarians 
and their critics were two questions : whether 
everyone's preferences count equally ; and 
whether everyone is equally capable of mak-
ing economic decisions. In Smith's account, 
all people, philosophers and subjects alike, 
are motivated by fame and fortune, and we 
are all equally capable of making decisions. 
The oppositional view held that some among 
us are different from others. Since "differ-
ence" implied "superiority" in the period we 
study, we call this doctrine "analytical hierar-
chicalism." 
Those who opposed the Classical econo-
mists' presumption of homogeneity focused 
on two purported heterogeneities between the 
expert and his subject. First, the expert was 
presumed to be untainted by considerations 
of self-interest, while his subject is motivated 
by self-interest. Second, perhaps because of 
superior self-control or some other inherent 
difference, the expert is supposed to be "supe-
rior" to or smarter than the subject he 
studies. It is important to note that this intel-
lectual superiority is not merely a matter of 
better information : the expert with whom we 
are concerned is someone who simply doesn't 
trust all subjects, who holds that some will 
always be hopelessly prone to making persist-
ent mistakes no matter how much we edu-
cate, train, and inculcate.2~ 
The notion of "expert" is deliberately
left broad. The key feature of those we refer 
to as "experts" is that the expert was some-
one who makes recommendations about how 
others might achieve human happiness. De-
pending on the specific context involved in 
what follows, "experts" may be social com-
mentators, biologists, or political economists 
(see Peart-Levy 2005a). 
F.Y. Edgeworth captured the difference 
between the egalitarian framework in J.S. 
Mill, and post-Darwinian ideas which implied 
that education and other institutional 
changes would fail to produce the desired 
social good. In 1881, he wrote that "the 
authority of Mill, conveying an impression of 
what other Benthamites have taught openly, 
that all men, if not equal, are at least 
equipotential, in virtue of equal educatability" 
would "probably result in the ruin of the 
race" because it failed to take into account 
"difference of quality" among men (Edge -
worth 1881, 132) .3) Ours is a story about how 
the category, "inferior subjects," changes 
over time : from the Irish, to blacks, to Jews, 
and so on. 
It is precisely this supposition of superi-
ority that Smith opposed, as the "vanity of 
the philosopher": such vanity implies the 
subject is in need of guidance from the 
expert. It also implies that the expert will be 
predisposed to disapprove of (and even dis-
allow) the subject making unfettered choices 
in a marketplace or in the direction of her 
affections in the household and elsewhere. As 
long as the expert maintains that he posses-
ses insight into the sorts of preferences peo-
ple "should" possess. - if they only knew 
better - he must also accept, and may per-
haps even demand, responsibility for direct-
ing those preferences until the subjects gain 
the sort of sophistication that he enjoys.4~ We 
suggest (Peart-Levy 2005b) that the "sci-
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ence" of eugenics operationalized this doc-
trine.5~ By contrast, the Classical economists' 
egalitarian notion of homogeneity - moti-
vational and otherwise - and choices un-
fettered by the direction of one's "betters," go 
hand in hand. 
The egalitarianism of the Classical Econ-
omists has a consequence which has long 
been misunderstood. If there is nothing to 
distinguish one person from another then an 
appropriate method for determining social 
policy is to count winners and losers and 
select the result upon that basis. (Peart-Levy 
2005a) .6) In a society with a larger number of 
laborers and a smaller number of non-
laborers, this analysis may appear to make 
"class" foundational . Class is a convenient 
concept as it allows a quick way to determine 
social policy. We cannot do better than to 
quote T.R. Malthus on that point at issue : 
The professed object of Dr Adam Smith's 
inquiry is the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations. There is another inquiry, 
however, perhaps still more interesting, 
which he occasionally mixes with it, I mean 
an inquiry into the causes which affect the 
happiness of nations or the happiness and 
comforts of the lower orders of society, 
which is the most numerous class in every 
nation. (Malthus 1798, ch. 16 Section 1) 
On our reading, Classical economists were 
less interested in "class," however, and more 
concerned with the majority affected by any 
policy they advocated.
Ⅱ Racism as the Primitive
Notions of "race" and hierarchy are ill-
defined, indeed unstable, in the mid-nine-
teenth and well into the twentieth century. 
Arguments about race and hierarchy fre-
quently played out both in terms of the Irish
and the former slaves in Jamaica(Curtis
1968,1997).The"labouring classes"were
also included in racially-charged discussions
of inherited incompetence. And hierarchy and
competence were mapped to gender and reli-
gion, as well.
This instability of"race"and hierarchy
invites us to take what we shall call racism as
primitive for our analysis and to consider
what distinctions were made by those we
study.7)Taking racism as the foundation for
our analysis is very much akin to what
Bishop Berkeley proposed by taking percep-
tion as the foundation for his work on vision.
One learns, Berkeley said, to perceive dis-
tance (Levy 2001). In line with Classical
economists such as John Stuart Mill, we
suggest that people learn to perceive"simi-
larity"or"difference."Part of the learning
process involves images and stories which
insist upon human homogeneity as well as
images and stories which purport that some
people are closer to beasts than they are to
people. Even as the perception of homogene-
ity widened to people across the globe and
sympathy extended to other races, the argu-
ment was put forward that some are more
deserving of sympathy than others, that
"charity begins at home
." This slogan is
central to nineteenth century"paternalism"
in that it recognizes that unregulated sympa-
thy and choices can endanger hierarchy.
Taking racism as primitive lets us deal with
the question of the Jewish"race"with the
same facility with which we deal with the
Irish"race."A"race"is what people of the
time perceive it to be.
To provide a thumbnail sketch of the
debates on human hierarchy, we use an index
of humanity or human hierarchy which
we denote α for the Greek anthrop, the
-17-
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human. We use this device to characterize 
two major positions in the period we study. 
We shall use cr in what follows to define a 
"race" because we find that race is conflated 
in our period with religion, gender and class. 
Political economy enters the argument 
because race is also conflated with choice. 
This conflation is perhaps best illustrated by 
the remarkable 1860 image by Charles Ben-
nett which conveys the message that a 
woman who exits the household to engage in 
market activity changes race. The image, 
entitled "Slavey," captures the malleability 
of "race" unforgettably." A woman who exits 
hierarchy through markets - by entering the 
labour force-devolves into "an enslaved 
African type of humanity." She is now per-
ceived as having chosen to be different, and 
must be so. 
The "progressive" doctrine that hierar-
Figure 1 Race as a Choice
chy humanizes, while exiting hierarchy to 
make self-directed choices causes racial 
devolution, is central to Charles Kingsley's 
influential children's tale, Water-Babies, as 
well as the Punch images we have studied 
(Peart-Levy 2005a). Water-Babies contains 
the story of the DoAsYouLikes -fond of 
playing a Jew's harp-whose devolution to 
apes and consequent extermination is a mat-
ter of no regret. As the last of the ape-men 
perishes at the hands of a European hunter, 
he tries to say that he was "man and a 
brother," but, having lost of the power of 
speech, fails in the attempt. The collision 
with Classical economics occurred by neces-
sity because for these economists such trans-
formations made no sense.
Ⅲ Theories of Human Capability
What defines the human and measures 
human capability? By common consent it is 
"rationality ." In our period, the concept of 
rationality had a social aspect because it 
presupposed both common language as well 
as the capacity for individual choice. Adam 
Smith supposed a social foundation for politi-
cal economy when he conjectured that 
humans trade because they reason and they 
speak a common language (Smith 1776, I. ii. 
Section 2 ; Rubinstein 2000). Thus, in terms of 
our a, there will be a discontinuity of the 
relation between a and reason at the edge of 
the development of language. 
Having attained the status of human, in 
the debates we study human capability is 
related to the ability to make economic and 
political choices, including the decision to 
marry and have children. For Classical econo-
mists, there are two key aspects of this capa-
bility : the ability to sympathize, that is, to 
take into account other people in the self-
interested calculus (Levy-Peart 2004a) ; and
-18-
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what contemporary economists call "time 
preference." 9) 
The ability to reason involves the ability 
to abstract. Those who opposed Classical 
economics held that such judgements were 
not to be trusted unless they were directed. 
Unregulated sympathetic judgements might 
yield resources to the undeserving. In the 
debates we have studied, positive time prefer-
ence was also viewed as a f ailing.10' As the 
case was made that some among us fail to 
make decisions optimally, perceptions of 
hierarchy and race entered economics : early 
British post-Classical writers maintained that 
lack of patience was a particularly Irish 
characteristic (see Peart-Levy 2005a). 
Here, we are interested in different speci-
fications of the relationship between human-
ity and economic ability (entailing sympa-
thetic and intertemporal judgements) in the 
great debates over hierarchy. We focus on 
two foundational views of the relationship : 
Adam Smith's ; and a "developmental" account. 
1. Adam Smith 
Smith considers all humans to be alike, 
with the potential exception of those who are 
regarded by their fellows as heroic. These
Figure 2 Adam Smith's View of Human Status
"imagined" types are objects of approval and 
emulation. All "real" individuals are equally 
human. 
2. Developmental 
The next graph presents two develop-
mental views of human nature which are 
often confounded. First, there is the utilitar-
ian developmental view associated with Mill 
and Herbert Spencer. Here, there is a posi-
tive monotonic relationship between a and 
economic ability. Second, there is the biologi-
cal developmental view associated with Greg 
and Galton. Here, ci attains a maximum at 
H * and then bends down. The downward 
sloping portion reflects the biologists' criti-
cism of utilitarians for paying insufficient 
attention to the deleterious consequence of 
undirected sympathy and ethics.'°
Figure 3 Developmental & Eugenic View of Human 
Status 
Consider the solid line, which represents 
the utilitarian developmental view. The sim-
ple curvature does not tell us what is the 
causal arrow : do we become better humans 
as we gain ability to make sensible choices ; 
or do more developed people make more 
sensible choices? Not surprisingly, there were 
different views on the matter. For Mill, im-
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proved ability to make choices, manifested in 
part as widened sympathy, improved one's 
human status. For Mill, the maximum a was 
attained by Socrates and Jesus Christ who 
revealed a willingness to die for strangers. 
And although Mill was critical of crude 
American materialism, he believed that the 
highest national a was attained by Amer-
icans who were willing to die to abolish the 
slavery of their fellows (Peart-Levy 2003). 
In the second half of the century, biolo-
gists called for a reduction, or at least a 
directing, of human sympathy and ethics -
critical considerations in the developmental 
view. A.R. Wallace had argued in 1864 that 
the principle of natural selection does not 
operate with humans because people possess 
sympathy for their fellow humans : we do not 
let the mentally infirm and the physically 
unable perish (Wallace 1864). The founders 
of what became known as eugenics responded 
that if this survival of the unfit were the 
result of sympathy in humans, sympathy 
should be suppressed.12) Thus, without sup-
pression (via eugenic policy), beyond a cer-
tain point - H* - an increase in ability 
entailing expanded sympathetic judgements, 
actually reduces a. Such thinking led to the 
eugenicists' program of biological remaking 
in order to prevent the biological decay that 
was said to follow the undirected acquisition 
of sympathetic tendencies in humans, to keep 
the human race from moving to the right of 
H*. The great divide upon which we focus in 
what follows is between those for whom the 
life of some people is worth more than the life 
of others and those for whom it is not.13>
Ⅳ Transformation　 Theories
The critics of Classical political economy 
held that human nature was malleable, and 
Classical economists erred in supposing that
people simply respond to incentives. So, in 
their view the dotted line version of human 
development above pertained, and it was up 
to the so-called expert to prevent people from 
achieving the downward bending portion of 
the curve. In other words, they predicted that, 
without help from their betters, many human 
beings were incapable of developing properly, 
and they might instead simply devolve. We 
focus here on the "character" transformation 
argument. Human nature was malleable and 
Mill and other political economists were in-
correct to presume otherwise.l4) 
The poet, John Ruskin, made this case 
most forcefully in 1860. He contrasted his 
"chemical" view of political economy with 
the "mathematical" view of Classical politi-
cal economists such as Mill. The mathemati-
cal approach supposed that the nature of man 
is fixed and people respond to incentives. By 
contrast, the chemical approach presupposes 
that people can be transformed (by experts 
or other social forces) ;15) 
But the disturbing elements in the social 
problem are not of the same nature of the 
constant one : they alter the essence of the 
creature under examination the moment 
they are added : they operate, not mathe-
matically, but chemically, introducing con-
ditions which render all our previous 
knowledge unavailable. (Ruskin 1905, p. 
26),16) 
For those who subscribed to the "chemical" 
view, the problem with Classical economics 
was that it failed to contemplate how to 
improve the subject. 
Admirers of the transf ormative view 
often suppose that transformation works in 
the upward direction : exposure to the right 
sort of art "improves" people, while exposure
-20-
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to market-generated culture cannot.'' The 
19th century view of transformation also 
focused on the possibility of transformation 
downward. If direction and hierarchy 
improve the human, the question arises, what 
happens if such hierarchy were removed? In 
1849, Thomas Carlyle asserted that the eman-
cipation of the West Indian slaves reduced 
them to subhuman status (Carlyle 1849, Levy 
2001). But nineteenth century arguments 
about institutions were more long-lasting 
than the attempt to preserve slavery by 
Carlyle and his followers. Other, less 
extreme, forms of hierarchy were offered up 
as transf ormative institutions that might 
improve not only the behavior but also the 
"essence" of individuals who operated within 
the hierarchy, while renunciation of hierar-
chy was said to degrade that essence. 
This transformational argument was 
made both in literary and visual forms - in 
the popular children's tale by Charles Kings-
ley, Water-Babies, and the caricatures of Irish 
Fenians published in the 1860s in Punch. In 
both its forms, the argument constituted an 
attack on Classical political economy. In 
"chemical" political economy , the renuncia-
tion of hierarchy by those who need direction 
transforms a human into an ape-man. The 
Irish who chose to achieve self-rule, like the 
woman who left the home to work in the 
Slavey image above, devolved into a "lesser" 
race. 
While scholars have discussed the ape-
like quality of Punch caricatures of the Irish 
(Curtis 1968, 1997),18 the devolution from 
human to ape in Kingsley's Water-Babies has 
been neglected. Such accounts have also neg-
lected the significance of hierarchy (or its 
renunciation to obtain self-government) in 
the predicted devolution of the subject ; as 
well as how the visual renderings proved
oppositional to Classical political economy. 
To illustrate the nature of chemical polit 
ical economy further, consider Ruskin's analy-
sis of the impact of railroad travel on the 
lower orders in Fors Clavigera.19~ Here is an 
English worker's transportation in the old 
days : 
In old times, if a Coniston peasant had any 
business at Ulverstone, he walked to Ulver-
stone ; spent nothing but shoe-leather on 
the road, drank at the streams, and if he 
spent a couple of batz when he got to 
Ulverstone, `it was the end of the world.' 
In the market economy, post-industrializa-
tion, the worker becomes "idle" and "stupid": 
But now he would never think of doing 
such a thing! He first walks three miles in 
a contrary direction to a railroad-station, 
and then travels by railroad twenty-four 
miles to Ulverstone, paying two shillings 
fare. During the twenty-four miles transit, 
he is idle, dusty, stupid, and either more hot 
or cold than is pleasant to him. In either 
case he drinks beer at two or three of the 
stations, passes his time between them with 
anybody he can find, in talking without 
having anything to talk of ; and such talk 
always becomes vicious. He arrives at 
Ulverstone, jaded, half-drunk, and other-
wise demoralized, and three shillings, at 
least, poorer than in the morning. Of that 
sum a shilling has gone for beer, threepence 
to a railway shareholder, threepence in 
coals, and eighteen pence has been spent in 
employing strong men in the vile mechani-
cal work of making and driving a machine, 
instead of his own legs to carry the 
drunken lout. The results, absolute loss and 
demoralization to the poor on all sides, and
-21-
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iniquitous gain to the rich. (Ruskin 1878, p. 
61) 
An English worker got on the train. But the 
train ride transformed him into a "jaded, 
half-drunk, and otherwise demoralized" bare-
ly human being. 
We have emphasized the importance of 
the egalitarian doctrine of abstract economic 
man, in the opposition to racial accounts of 
political economy. In his 1848 Principles, Mill 
outlined the implication of such a method. He 
rejected racial "explanations" of outcomes, 
which he condemned specifically with refer-
ence to the Irish. Institutions, not "Irishness," 
explained the Irish problems : 
Is it not, then, a bitter satire on the mode in 
which opinions are formed on the most 
important problems of human nature and 
life, to find public instructors of the 
greatest pretensions, imputing the back-
wardness of Irish industry, and the want of 
energy of the Irish people in improving 
their condition, to a peculiar indolence and 
insouciance in the Celtic race? Of all vulgar 
modes of escaping from the consideration 
of the effect of social and moral influences 
on the human mind, the most vulgar is that 
of attributing the diversities of conduct and 
character to inherent natural differences. 
(Mill 1848, 319) 
The doctrine of abstract economic man has 
always been contested and in the Victorian 
period the criticism focused on abstraction 
from the "fact" of racial difference. As an 
important instance of this contestation we 
quote from an 1869 issue of the Quarterly 
Review, written by the co-founder (with 
Francis Galton) of eugenics, W.R. Greg :
' Make them peasant-proprietors,' says Mr. 
Mill. But Mr. Mill forgets that, till you 
change the character of the Irish cottier, 
peasant-proprietorship would work no mir-
acles. He would fall behind the instalments 
of his purchase-money, and would be called 
upon to surrender his farm. He would often 
neglect it in idleness, ignorance, jollity and 
drink, get into debt, and have to sell his 
property to the nearest owner of a great 
estate.... In two generations Ireland would 
again be England's difficulty, come back 
upon her in an aggravated form. Mr. Mill 
never deigns to consider that an Irishman is 
an Irishman, and not an average human 
being - an idiomatic and idiosyncratic, not 
an abstract, man. (Greg 1869, p. 78) 
An Englishman got on Ruskin's train ; Greg's 
Irishman got off. Chemical political economy 
implies that humans are transformed or im-
proved, changed from one race to another. 
Unfettered choices that occur with industrial-
ization and economic development serve to 
reduce human status, because the improving 
influence of hierarchy is renounced. On the 
other hand, guidance by the social commenta-
tor, embodied in paternalistic institutions, 
prevents a movement downwards to a lower 
human status, and may move the individual 
up in the hierarchy of human status.
Ⅴ Transformation　 by　 Obedience
If racial stereotypes form the molecules 
of chemical political economy, then we need 
to consider how Victorian perceptions of 
human hierarchy changed in the latter half of 
the 19th century.20' Scholars have long made 
a distinction between literary racists 
(Thomas Carlyle in the forefront) and the 
scientific racists who clustered around James 
Hunt and his Anthropological Review. These
-22-
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groups had at least one member in common : 
Charles Kingsley.2° Kingsley is known for 
many contributions. He seems to have 
contributed one of "facts" in Hunt's [Septem-
ber 1863] Negro's Place in Nature : 
- "Many observers have noticed the fact 
that the Negro frequently uses the great 
toe as a thumb." (Hunt 1863b, 7) 
The same claim appeared in Kingsley's 
Water-Babies, published in installments ear-
lier that year in Macmillan's Magazine: 
... they laid of the branches with their great 
toes, as if they had been thumbs, just as a 
Hindoo tailor uses his toes to thread his 
needle" (Kingsley 1863, 217) 
First published in book form in 1863 and 
never thereafter out of print, Kingsley's story 
for children was arguably the most successful 
and long-lived disseminator of the chemical 
thesis. Water-Babies had the distinction of 
being reviewed both by the Times and Hunt's 
Anthropological Review. One of Kingsley's 
explicit targets is the political economy of his 
contemporaries which denies the possibility 
of transformation.22~ 
One is transformed by following the rec-
ommendations of one's betters, by submitting 
to hierarchy. The telling episode in Water-
Babies occurs in the tale of the now-extinct 
DoAsYouLikes who exit hierarchy : 
And in the next five hundred years they 
were all dead and gone, by bad food and 
wild beasts and hunters ; all except one 
tremendous old fellow with jaws like a 
jack, who stood full seven feet high ; and 
M. Du Chaillu came up to him, and shot
him, as he stood roaring and thumping his 
breast. And he remembered that his ances-
tors had once been men, and tried to say, 
'Am I not a man and a brother?' but had 
forgotten how to use his tongue ; and then 
he had tried to call for a doctor, but he had 
forgotten the word for one. So all he said 
was 'Ubboboo!" and died. (Kingsley 1863, 
247-48) 
In the midst of the American Civil War, no 
one would miss the reference to the abolition-
ist question - "Am I not a man and a 
brother?" 23) And we have a loss of language 
that accompanies the devolution to bestial. 
In this episode about how the absence of 
compulsion causes racial devolution, Kings-
ley makes an Irish reference to the jaw as a 
marker of the primitive : 
"Why ," said Tom, "they are growing 
no better than savages." 
"And look how ugly they are all get-
ting," said Ellie. 
"Yes ; when people live on poor vegeta 
tiles instead of roast beef and plum-pud-
ding, their jaws grow large, and their lips 
grow coarse, like the poor Paddies who eat 
potatoes." (Kingsley 1863, 244) 24) 
The conjunction of Darwinian science, Car-
lyle, and the devolution thesis in Kingsley is 
explicated by the review of Water-Babies in 
the Times : 
And if we should never heard of Tom and 
Ellie but for the development of Marine 
Zoology, we may add that Master Tom's 
education would have been impossible had 
not Mr. Darwin published his book on the 
Origin of Species. Mr Kingsley trips up the 
Darwinian theory, and ask us how we like
-23-
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Figure 4 Punch on the Disloyal Irish
Figure 5 Punch on the Loyal Irish
its application when inverted. If an ascent 
in the order of life be possible, must not a 
degradation of movement downwards be 
equally possible? If beasts can be turned 
into men, must not men be liable to be 
turned into beasts? Here, indeed, Mr. King-
sley might have quoted the authority of one 
of his great masters, Mr Carlyle, who long 
ago warned us of the fate of the dwellers by 
the Dead Sea who refused to listen to the 
preaching of Moses. They became apes, 
poor wretches, and having once had souls 
they lost them. (The Times, 26 January 
1864, p. 6) 
Those who renounce hierarchy, devolve and 
exit humanity. This argument was also made 
visually, in the cartoons of the Victorian 
magazine, Punch. Consider the following 
example (Figure 4) in which the unruly Irish 
have devolved to ape-like status. By contrast, 
those who choose to serve their British mas-
ters are viewed as fully human (Figure 5). 
The message is one of "noblesse oblige": the 
expert takes on the much-needed responsibil-
ity of ensuring that mankind avoids such 
terrible outcomes. The contrast with Classi-
cal political economy is striking : Smith, 
Malthus and Mill all trust individuals to 
make choices on their own, presupposing no 
special knowledge of what these choices 
should be.
Ⅵ Conclusion
This paper has shown how the political 
economists' view of human nature-we're 
all the same, equally capable of making 
choices and of self-improvement - was 
attacked on a number of fronts at mid-
century. We have argued that the divide 
occurred in terms of how transformation 
might occur : by one's self (Mill's view), or
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by one's "betters" (the view of Kingsley, 
Ruskin, and Carlyle). 
We turn in closing to our critics, those 
who hold that we have misconstrued the 
debates or their participants. We have been 
told more than once that our outrage at the 
mid to late nineteenth century notions of race 
and hierarchy is misplaced. Everyone, we 
have been told, "was a racist then." 25) It will 
now be clear that we reject this counterargu-
ment. We do so because we find it factually 
incorrect, and analytically flawed. In point of 
fact, our research demonstrates that there 
was significant (though unsuccessful) resis-
tance to hierarchy and race. Classical econo-
mists rejected racial explanations of obser-
ved behavior, and were criticized for doing 
so. More than this, we find the counterargu-
ment embodies a form of not-so-subtle hierar-
chical thinking : the thought that we today 
are superior to those of the past ; that we who 
are non-racist must excuse the racist writers 
of the past, because they simply reflect their 
times. 
The Classical economists' explanation 
for observed heterogeneity was to appeal to 
the incentives associated with different insti-
tutions. So, for instance, Classical economists 
such as John Stuart Mill argued that the Irish 
problem was largely a matter of institutions 
rather than one of inherent indolence.26~ Mill 
was strenuously opposed by those who 
claimed the Irishman was "idiosyncratic" and 
would never be the hard-working Scot. The 
policy conclusion followed : special measures 
were required to look after the Irishman, 
whose inherent difference meant he lacked 
the capacity to rule himself. Mill struggled 
with the problem of transition from one set of 
institutions to another, how new habits are 
formed as institutions change. Economists 
who have become accustomed to institution-
free analysis, fail to appreciate how much of 
Classical economics is designed to deal pre-
cisely with the problem of self-motivated 
human development in the context of institu-
tional change. 
A second potential difficulty for our 
position is that while Carlyle's attitudes on 
race and hierarchy were horrible, those of, 
say, a Kingsley were rather more "progres-
sive" and less hateful. The Sages' opposition 
to markets, it is claimed, might have been 
framed along lines that we haven't yet consid-
ered. By offering paternalism as an alterna-
tive to both markets and slavery, some of the 
Sages might be salvaged as caring, progres-
sive social commentators, commentators who 
genuinely wished to see the lot of the working 
poor improved. Thus, there may have been 
some paternalists whose distrust of markets 
can be contrasted with our characterization 
of Ruskin and Carlyle (Levy-Peart 
2001-2002). Those paternalists, the argument 
continues, were not necessarily racists. 
We have argued that, as a matter of fact, 
those paternalists were racists. Posing the 
problem as a choice among markets, slavery, 
and (somewhere in between), paternalism, 
suggests why contemporary scholars might 
be prepared to defend the Victorian Sages 
even today. Their analysis today, as in the 
nineteenth century, is a form of elitism that 
we find particularly objectionable : in defend-
ing Ruskin, Carlyle and Kingsley, our critics 
are arguing, today, that the working classes 
of nineteenth century England were in need 
of transformation by their "betters." We are 
much more comfortable with, instead, Mill's 
position that to the extent that transforma-
tion might occur, it would be the result of 
self-discovery and choice rather than at the 
recommendation (and imposition) of experts.27) 
We hold that the Classical economists
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got it right : an analytical system in which 
everyone counts equally and is presumed 
equally capable of making decisions, is the 
only system which seems morally defensible 
to us.28) And, not surprisingly, we find analyti-
cal systems that presume hierarchy are in-
defensible. This paper has attempted to 
explain why. 
First, we find the history compelling, and 
awful. In all the instances above in which a 
group has been treated as "different," differ-
ence has turned into hierarchy, and hierarchy 
has sometimes led to terrible analytical and 
policy consequences.29) As noted above, we 
also find that systems in which hierarchy is 
invoked are extraordinarily pliable. The 
"inferior" becomes any group who is present-
ly out of favor with the analyst. 
Most compelling for us, the analysis 
which presumes difference is terribly tempt-
ing to the analysts and policy makers. Once 
difference creeps into the analysis, the temp-
tation is to presume that difference implies 
inferiority. It also seems often to imply that 
the writer, whether social commentator or 
scientist, somehow "knows better." And here 
we find that this is not simply a presumption 
that the analyst has better information. 
Instead, it extends to a presumption of inher-
ent superiority. For whatever reason, the 
analyst presumes the subjects' choices aren't 
to be trusted but instead require looking-
after. Somehow, the analyst is privy to 
knowledge about what decisions "should" be 
made and what preferences individuals 
"should" have , if they only knew better. As a 
society and as a community of academics, we 
have come to accept the proposition that the 
scientist is somehow superior to - better 
motivated or more able than - the individ-
uals under investigation. We fail to trust 
those individuals to make reasonable choices.
The co-authors find such a presumption of 
superiority on the part of the analyst is the 
last, unrecognized and resisted, form of hier-
archy in social science. It is, we have argued, 
simply the "vanity of the philosopher." 
(Peart-Levy 2005a) 
Finally, we have been asked, what if 
there are real differences among people? A 
look around us at any moment suggests that 
people are, in fact, different - inherent physi-
cal differences, for instance, abound. (One 
co-author is under 5 feet 2 inches, the other is 
about 6 feet, and relative price changes are 
not likely to reduce this difference.) So, our 
argument has much in common with Lionel 
Robbins,' who in 1938 remembered the deba-
tes in economics over the differential capac-
ity for happiness : 
I have always felt that, as a first approxi-
mation in handling questions relating to the 
lives and actions of large masses of people, 
the approach which counts each man as 
one, and, on that assumption, asks which 
way lies the greatest happiness, is less like-
ly to lead one astray than any of the abso-
lute systems. I do not believe, and I never 
have believed, that in fact men are neces-
sarily equal or should always be judged as 
such. But I do believe that, in most cases, 
political calculations which do not treat 
them as if they were equal are morally 
revolting. (Robbins 1938, 635) 
The lesson we draw from the history in our 
"Vanity of the Philosopher ," is that a pre-
sumption of group difference - when the 
definition of the group is pliable and the 
analyst is presumed to be in the superior 
group - is dangerously tempting. Analytical 
egalitarianism is a defense against the temp-
tation of the theorist.
-26-
Peart and Levy Attitudes Towards Race, Hierarchy and Transformation in the 19th Century
Explaining the role of the expert in a 
system of analytical egalitarianism is per-
haps the most interesting question we face. 
Frank Knight regarded the problem of how 
people pick an expert physician as central. 
Knight believed that the solution required a 
strong ethical component to restrict the 
expert from exploiting someone with less 
inf ormation.30' In such an ethical system, it 
may be important for the expert to believe 
that she is no different, except for the posses-
sion of information, from ordinary people. 
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Notes 
1) This list of characters is not exhaustive ; see 
Peart-Levy 2005a for details. We prefer 
"post -Classical ," to the more familiar "neo-
classical" terminology. On the origin of the 
term "neoclassical," see Colander (2001, pp. 
154ff.). We find the transition entailing the 
rise of hierarchical thinking, the loss of sym-
pathy and the endorsement of eugenical re-
making, infects a broad set of economists, 
not all of whom would be considered "neo-
classical." Traditions within and outside of 
"neoclassical" economics - the Austrian 
school scattered by the coming of the Hitler 
era, as well as the London school and 
Chicago - revived the presupposition of 
equal competence in the twentieth century 
(Peart-Levy 2005a). 
2) In Smith's account, people begin from their 
understanding of the world as summarized 
by proverbial wisdom. Like Smith, Malthus 
recognized that the agents about whom he 
wrote have theories or beliefs of their own : 
people can foresee the misery attendant on an 
overly large family and they take that into 
account when they decide to marry. In one 
remarkable passage Malthus explains that 
the foresight of ordinary people is an attempt 
to unwrap the regularities of nature. Because
of these regularities, people are both able 
and willing to work and plan (Malthus 1798, 
Chapter XVIII, par. 10) For Malthus, at 
foundation there is no difference between the 
foresight of the ordinary person and the 
activity of the greatest of all natural philoso-
phers, Newton. The ordinary person's wis-
dom takes proverbial form so that others 
might profit from it. For more on how 
Malthus fits into our account, see Peart-
Levy 2005b. 
3) Edgeworth calls Mill's equal educatability 
argument "pre-Darwin prejudice" (Edgeworth 
1881, 132). 
4) The expert might also challenge consumer 
sovereignty. Twentieth century examples in 
recent history include Maurice Dobb (1933) 
and J. K. Galbraith (1958). These were 
countered by Abba Lerner (1934) and F.A. 
Hayek (1961). But neither Dobb nor Gal-
braith challenged the doctrine of the stability 
of the agent's personal identity through 
choice. 
5) Our focus in what follows is mainly on the 
theories of human nature, transformative or 
otherwise, and less on the technical investi-
gations by eugenics-influenced economists 
and statisticians late in the century. For 
details, see Peart-Levy 2005a and Levy-
Peart 2004b. 
6) The Classical economists' presupposition of 
sympathetic agents is critical to block the 
tyranny of the majority (Peart-Levy 2005d). 
7) We use the more familiar "racism" rather 
than the unwieldy "hierarchicalism" here, to 
signify thinking in which groups are per 
ceived as superior vs. inferior. Glenn Loury's 
axiom : "Race' is a socially constructed 
mode of human categorization" (Loury 2002, 
5) is much to the point. In Peart-Levy 2005a 
we focus on the microf oundations of such a 
construction while attempting (by using 
Mill's constructions) to use the machinery 
found within the period we study. 
8) The accompanying text makes it clear that 
Bennett is on Carlyle's side in the debate 
over slavery with Mill : "It will be noticed 
that the eidolographic development of Miss 
Hipswidge is strikingly suggestive of the
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enslaved African type of humanity. The 
banjo, castanets, `abundant pumpkin,' and 
other conventional solaces of that persecuted 
race are, however, wanting to make the 
resemblance perfect." Bennett and Brough 
(1860, p. 33). The "abundant pumpkin" is a 
phrase from Carlyle's "Negro question" dis-
cussed in Levy 2001 and Levy-Peart 2001-02. 
9) On the significance of sympathy, see Levy-
Peart 2004a and 2005. On the characteriza-
tion of time preference late in the century, 
see Peart 2000 and Peart-Levy 2005d. 
10) W.S. Jevons, for instance, argued that in 
matters of intertemporal decisions, the labor-
ing classes were inherently myopic and prone 
to making systematical mistakes. For a dem-
onstration of such views in Jevons, Marshall, 
Pigou and Fisher, see Peart 2000; on Pigou, 
see Collard 1996. 
11) Is it possible to be "too" rational? Thomas 
Carlyle judged his adversary, John Stuart 
Mill, to be a "logic-chopping machine." At 
the beginning of Mill's attempt to bring jus-
tice to murdered and mutilated Jamaicans, 
he wrote that we must not let narrow self-
interest distract us from the demands of 
impartial justice for our fellow creatures 
(Peart-Levy 2005a). 
12) See Peart-Levy 2005a and Levy- Peart 2004 
b for the texts and details. 
13) In opposition to Mill's equality proposition, 
Edgeworth responded "Accordingly in the 
`koomposh' of an unlimited pauper popula-
tion, the most favourable disposition might 
seem to be (abstracted from practical consid-
erations, and if the delineation of Wundt be 
verified within and beyond the region of 
sensation), might seem perhaps to be, that 
adhering ex hypothesi to the letter of the first 
problem, we should be guided by the spirit of 
the second problem, should wish to cut off 
the redundant numbers with an illusory por-
tion, so as to transfer substantial (equal) 
portions to a few. There might be, as it were, 
a mulcting of many brothers to make a few 
eldest sons." (Edgeworth 1877, p. 61). We 
examine Edgeworth's position in Peart-Levy 
2005a in which we explore his blending of 
Darwin, Galton and utilitarianism. Edge-
worth's eugenic utilitarianism in Mathematical 
Psychics, which advocates the removal from 
the population of those with the lowest 
capacity for happiness, has long been over-
looked. One does not fully understand "cardi-
nal utilitarianism" until one realizes that, as 
formulated by Edgeworth, there is no reason 
to believe that a person might have positive 
lifetime utility and thus whose existence 
forms an impediment to social happiness. 
14) Mill is clearly in opposition to Ruskin in this 
debate, but he takes a different position from 
that of Smith. For Mill, human improvement 
is possible : the human nature characteriza-
tion is upward sloping. What separates him 
from Ruskin and other "progressives" of the 
time, is that for Mill, "improvement" was 
to be self- (rather than "expert"-) directed. 
Unlike Ruskin, human development occurs 
as individuals freely recognize their human 
potential in the context of discussion and 
trial and error. No expert is required to show 
people what to do or choose and all are 
equally capable of human improvement. See 
Peart-Levy 2003. 
15) Ruskin (and other critics of Mill's political 
economy), sometimes writes as though one 
individual may be transformed into another 
(better or worse) individual. At the same 
time, the case was also made that there are 
group variations : that Irish or blacks as a 
whole need to be transformed. 
16) Classical political economy also failed 
because it supposed that the exchange of 
untransformed goods was profitable. For 
exchange to generate net benefits, Ruskin 
held, there must be a transformation. Ruskin 
(1905, pp. 90-91). 
17) Jevons's "Amusements of the People" relied 
on this distinction when he called for the 
"deliberate cultivation of public amuse-
ment": "the well-conducted Concert-room 
versus the inane and vulgar Music-hall" 
(Jevons 1878, 7). The discussion within eco-
nomics over the possibility of metaprefer-
ences (George 2001) - when an individual 
prefers one set of preferences to another -
assumes that to the extent that an individual 
is remade, she is in charge of her own deci-
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sions. The problem of adult rehabituation as 
one moves from (say) slavery to markets 
was much on J. S. Mill's mind in his Princi-
ples of Political Economy. See Peart-Levy 
2003. 
18) Curtis finds that caricatures of the Irish 
reflect four Irish types : Northern Irish 
Protestant ; rustic male small farmer (Pat) ; 
prognathous and hairy plebeian Irishman 
(Paddy); and "simian Paddy." Like us, he 
sees a process by which caricatures became 
increasingly simian, or ape-like, throughout 
the 1860s. (Curtis 1997, 20; 22; 29). 
19) We quote from the 19th century republica-
tion in an American periodical to emphasize 
the contemporary importance. The extracts 
by Walter Levin in Ruskin (1893) are taken 
largely from Fors Clavigera. 
20) We do not wish to imply that it is impossible 
to conceive of transformation possibilities 
independently of race. There may also be 
gender and religious transformations. There 
is a hint of simianization in a purely English 
context in a Punch cartoon of 4 August 1866, 
"No Rough-ianism" which carries the cap-
tion : "Working-Man: `Look here, you vaga-
bond! Right or wrong, we won't have your 
help!" The English ruffian holds a rock and 
a broken branch. 
21) Correspondence from Kingsley to Hunt is 
published in Levy (2001) answering an open 
question about the Hunt-Kingsley connect-
ion. Andrew Farrant and Nicola Tynan are 
thanked for bringing the importance of 
Water-Babies to our attention. 
22) The agents of transformation in Water-
Babies are fairies : "Some people think that 
there are no fairies.... And Aunt Agitate, in 
her Arguments on political economy, says 
there are none. Well, perhaps there are none, 
in her political economy." (1863, p. 60) 
Fairies also play a role in Kingsley's 1864 
Roman and Teuton, his Regis Lectures of 
Modern History at Cambridge (Kingsley 
1864). 
23) It was commented upon in the review in the 
Anthropological Review (Hunt 1863a, 472). 
The review adds to the information on the 
title page ("The Rev. Charles Kingsley")
that the author is "Honorary Fellow of the 
Anthropological Society of London, and 
Professor of Modern History in the Univer-
sity of Cambridge." (Hunt 1863, 472). 
24) Curtis remarks on "Charles Kingsley's 
description of the poor peasants he saw in 
County Mayo and Connemera in 1860 as 
`white chimpanzees ." (Curtis 1997, 100) 
25) We first encountered this criticism at the 
Christian A. Johnson conference that fea-
tured some of our research at Middlebury 
College in 2000. The conference proceedings 
contain a number of pieces that criticize our 
work as well as our response ; see Colander, 
Prasch and Sheth, 2004. 
26) Senior also attributed outcomes to institu-
tions rather than inherent differences : 
"Almost all the differences between the dif-
ferent races of men, differences so great that 
we sometimes nearly forget that they all 
belong to the same species, may be traced to 
the degree in which they enjoy the blessings 
of good government." (Senior 1836, p. 76) 
27) To fully appreciate the importance of "pro-
gressives" like Kingsley, one must consider 
how he came to endorse (the biologists' goal 
of) human "progress" at the expense of (the 
economists' goal of) human "happiness" and 
claimed that the doctrine of racial survival 
was the "natural theology of the future." 
This is the topic of Peart-Levy 2005c. 
28) This is not to say that we agree in all 
respects with all Classical economists, or 
that we disagree always with all their oppo-
nents. We find analysis that presumes homo-
geneity is compelling, and we object to treat-
ments entailing hierarchy. And we find that, 
on balance, the Classical economists fall on 
the side of homogeneity, while (again, on 
balance), their critics fall on the side of 
hierarchy. 
29) Much of the material in our "Vanity" 
(Peart- Levy 2005a) has in fact been difficult 
for us to read. We reproduce it there, and 
examine the arguments made thereby, in 
order to set the record straight, to learn from 
the past, and to make our case in favor of 




30) "A patient who would choose his doctor 
scientifically would, in the first place, have 
himself to know all medical science, or at 
least all that known to any and all candi-
dates for the place, and in addition know just 
the amount of this knowledge possessed by 
each candidate. But this is only half the 
story, and perhaps the smaller half. Our poor 
patient would further be required to know 
the degree in which each candidate would 
use his knowledge in his, the patient's inter-
est. "If the problem of competence in an agent 
admits of no solution because of its magni-
tude and complexity, that of the moral 
admits of none, of an intellectual sort, by its 
very nature. One who is to act for another 
with special competence, superior to that of 
his principal, and with fidelity, must be 
picked for competence and trustworthiness 
by some intuitive process, and must then be 
trusted. Sanctions of the sort found in every 
society no doubt help in security trustworthi-
ness. About all these matters we have little 
knowledge, and the only that can be said 
with assurance is that (peace to the shade of 
Jeremy Bentham!), no machinery of sanc-
tions can conceivably function without very 
large aid from moral forces." (Knight 1934, 
29-30). 
References 
Bennett, Charles H. and Robert B. Brough.1860. 
Shadow and Substance. London : W. Kent & 
Co. 
[Carlyle, Thomas.] 1849. Occasional Discourse 
on the Negro Question. Fraser's Magazine 
for Town and Country 40: 670-79. 
Colander, David. 2001. The Lost Art of Eco-
nomics : Essays on Economics and the Eco-
nomics Profession. Cheltenham, UK : Edward 
Elgar. 
Colander, David, Robert E. Prasch and Falguni 
A. Sheth (eds.) 2004. Race, Liberalism and 
Economics. Ann Arbor : University of Mich-
igan Press. 
Collard, David. 1996. Pigou and Future Genera-
tions : a Cambridge Tradition. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 20 (September) : 585-97.
Curtis, L.P., Jr. 1968. Anglo-Saxons and Celts. 
Bridgeport : Conference on British Studies at 
the University of Bridgeport. 
1997. Apes and Angels : the Irishman in 
 Victorian Caricature. Revised edition. Wash-
ington : Smithsonian Institution Press. 
Dobb, Maurice. 1933. Economic Theory and the 
Problems of a Socialist Economy. Economic 
Journal 43 (December) : 588-98. 
Edgeworth, F.Y. 1877. New and Old Methods of 
Ethics, or "Physical Ethics" and "Methods of 
Ethics." Oxford : James Parker and Co. 
1881. Mathematical Psychics. London : C. 
Kegan Paul & Co. 
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1958. The Affluent 
Society. Boston : Houghton Mifflin. 
George, David. 2001. Preference Pollution : How 
Markets Create the Desires We Dislike. Ann 
Arbor : University of Michigan Press. 
[Greg, W.R.] 1869. Realities of Irish Life. Quar-
terly Review 126 : 61-80. 
Hayek, F.A. 1961. The Non-Sequitur of the 
"Dependence Effect ." Southern Economic 
Journal 27: 346-48. 
[Hunt, James.] 1863a. Kingsley's Water Babies. 
Anthropological Review 1: 472-76. 
Hunt, James. 1863b. The Negro's Place in 
Nature: A Paper read before the London 
Anthropological Society. New York, 1864. 
Jevons, W.S. 1878. Amusements of the People in 
Methods of Social Reform, 1883. New York : 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1965: 1-27. 
Kingsley, Charles. August 1862-January 1863. 
The Water-Babies : A Fairy Tale for a Land-
Baby. Macmillan's Magazine 6 and 7. 
1863. The Water-Babies : A Fairy Tale for a 
Land-Baby. London & Cambridge : Macmil-
lan. 
1864. The Roman and the Teuton. Cambridge 
and London : Macmillan. 
Knight, Frank H. 1934. Social Science and Politi-
cal Trend. In Freedom and Reform. New 
York and London : Harper & Brothers, 1947: 
19-44. 
Lerner, A.P. 1934. Economic Theory and Social-
ist Economy. Review of Economic Studies 
2 (October) : 51-61. 
Levy, David M. 2001. How the Dismal Science 
Got Its Name : Classical Economics and the
-30-
Peart and Levy Attitudes Towards Race, Hierarchy and Transformation in the 19th Century
Ur-Text of Racial Politics. Ann Arbor : Uni-
versity of Michigan Press. 
Levy, David M. And Sandra J. Peart. 2001-02. 
The Secret History of the Dismal Science. 
[http:// www.econlib.org / library / Columns / 
LevyPeartdismal.html] 
2004a. Sympathy and Approbation in Hume 
and Smith : a Solution to the Other Rational 
Species Problem. Economics and Philosophy 
20: 331-49. 
2004b. Statistical Prejudice : From Eugenics 
to Immigrants. European Journal of Political 
Economy 20 (March) : 5-22. 
2005. The Simple Analytics of Sympathetic 
Exchange. Public Choice Working Paper. 
Loury, Glenn C. 2002. The Anatomy of Racial 
Inequality. Cambridge : Harvard University 
Press. 
[Malthus, T.R.] 1798. An Essay on the Principle 
of Population as It Affects the Future 
Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the 
Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, 
and Other Writers [http://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Malthus/malPop.html] 
Mill, J.S. 1848. The Principles of Political Econ-
omy with Some of Their Applications to 
Social Philosophy. Volume 2 of Collected 
Works. Edited by J. M. Robson. Toronto : 
University of Toronto Press, 1965. 
Packe, Michael St. John. 1954. The Life of John 
Stuart Mill. New York : Macmillan, 1954. 
Peart, Sandra J. 2000. Irrationality and Inter-
temporal Choice in Early Neoclassical 
Thought. Canadian Journal of Economics 
33: 175-88. 
Peart, Sandra J. and David M. Levy. 2003. Post-
Ricardian British Economics, 1830-1870. 
Blackwell Companion to the History of Eco-
nomic Thought, edited by Warren Samuels, 
Jeff Biddle and John Davis, 130-47. Malden, 
MA : Blackwell Publishing. 
2005a. The "Vanity of the Philosopher"
From Equality to Hierarchy in Post-Classical 
Economics. Ann Arbor : University of Mich-
igan Press. 
2005b. Happiness, Progress, and the "Vanity 
of the Philosopher." [http://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Columns/y2005/ PeartLevymalthus. 
html] 
2005c. Happiness, Progress and the Theologi-
cal Interpretation of Natural Selection. Pub-
lic Choice Working Paper. 
2005d. A Discipline Without Sympathy : 
From Median Well-Being to Mean Well-
Being. Canadian Journal of Economics, 38 
(August). 
Robbins, Lionel.1938. Interpersonal Comparisons 
of Utility : a Comment. Economic Journal 
48 (December) : 635-41. 
Rubinstein, Ariel. 2000. Economics and Language. 
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 
[Ruskin, John.] (July 1878). Ruskin's "Fors 
Clavigera." Appleton's Journal 5 : 58-65. 
Ruskin, John. 1893. Ruskin on Himself and 
Things in General. Edited by William Lewin. 
Illustration by J [ohn] W [allace]. Cope's 
Smoke-Room Booklet 13. Liverpool: Cope's 
Tobacco Plant. 
1905. Unto this Last. The Works of John 
Ruskin. Edited by E.T. Cook and Alexander 
Wedderburn. Volume 17: 1-114. London : G. 
Allen. 
Senior, Nassau W. 1836. An Outline of the Sci-
ence of Political Economy. London : G. 
Allen & Unwin, 1938. 
Smith, A. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by 
Edwin Cannan. [http:// www.econlib.org/ 
library/Smith/smWN.html] 
Wallace, AR. 1864. The Origin of Human Races 
and the Antiquity of Man Deduced from the 
Theory of "Natural Selection." Journal of 
the Anthropology Society 2 : clviii-cixx.
-31-
